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Introduction
'No taxation without representation' is an adage frequently applied in reverse to Arab states. Where goods, services and income are distributed to citizens, but tax is either not collected or is collected inefficiently or selectively, consensus may be achieved by means other than democratic legitimation (Luciani 1994: 132) . In economies where state revenues derive not from personal income tax but from rents of one form or another, governments are seen to lack what one analyst has called the 'organic, albeit adversarial, links with their citizens that taxation is believed to bring about' (Waterbury 1994: 29-30) . Oil rents remain the mainstay of budgets in many Arab oil foreign grants were projected to provide nearly 12% of revenue, whereas taxes on income and profits were set to contribute less than 10%. It is also the case, however, that, in the long term, both oil rents and security rents in the Arab region are on a downward trend, prompting suggestions (e.g. Norton 1997: 11) that rentier, or distributive, states may behave like production states after all in exhibiting a link between income and representation. In other words, just as tax extractions are linked to political representation of tax-payers, it may be that a reduction in rents, by leading to a reduction in welfare and other entitlements, could ultimately have the same impact -in terms of pressure for government accountability -as an increase in personal income tax.
Clement Henry and Robert Springborg (2001: 74-78 ) draw a direct link between a lack of transparency and political accountability in Arab countries and their inability to mobilise public resources through extraction of tax. They show that, while overall tax extraction matches that in other regions as a proportion of GDP, a close analysis of tax by type reveals a different picture. Direct taxes on individual incomes are typically some 10% of GDP in Europe (2001:76) . In Egypt and Jordan, in contrast, taxes on individual incomes and profits are only 0.7% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. compounded by the fact that customs tariffs and corporate taxation need to be reduced to encourage foreign investment and trade of a kind that will create jobs.
Arab governments would thus appear to have reached a policy crossroads. Standing still is not an option if much-needed internal resources are to be mobilised. Yet, based on the foregoing analysis, moving forward on resource mobilisation implies a simultaneous move towards greater transparency and accountability. The remainder of this paper considers whether there is any evidence that such a move is taking place. It assesses trends in transparency and accountability since the start of the 1990s, focusing on government approaches to freedom of expression in the media and among non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It begins by reviewing laws and political structures that shape such approaches and then deals in turn with changes in regulation affecting the media and NGOs.
Laws and political structures
In practical terms, as evidence in this paper will show, citizens in the majority of Arab states lack functioning institutional mechanisms for holding their governments to account. This is especially true in situations where legislation empowers heads of state to rule by decree. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the 1992 Basic Law enshrined the absolute authority of the king. In Egypt and Syria, State of Emergency laws have been used for decades to override constitutional guarantees of citizens' rights. Emergency laws confer powers of censorship and arbitrary arrest and detention and authorise the use of special security courts whose verdicts are not subject to appeal (Amnesty International 2000; Article XIX 1998a: 21-24 
Separation of powers
In countries where the exercise of power is highly centralised, both functionally and geographically, the best hope for populations to push for accountability is by taking advantage of any checks and balances that may exist through the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Generalisation about the extent of such separation across the Arab world is hazardous, but it can be said that moves towards the separation of powers over the past ten years have been limited. (Article XIX 1998b: 9) . Nothing was left to chance in general elections, so that ruling parties in both Tunisia and Egypt were returned with overwhelming majorities in both parliamentary and municipal elections (Langohr 2000; Makram-Ebeid 1996: 131; Middle East International 2000: 17; Pelham 1999; 13) . In Morocco in contrast, constitutional reform approved by referendum in 1996 enhanced the separation of powers through the introduction of a bicameral parliament, with a lower house wholly elected by universal suffrage. A prime minister from Morocco's socialist opposition bloc was asked to form a cabinet. Even so, appointees to the key ministries of interior, finance and foreign policy were still chosen by the king. and media activity that might harm the other country" (Article XIXa 1998: 59-60) . 4 The effect of a decade of international sanctions on Iraq can be gauged from UNDP data on infant mortality which, in stark contrast to the global trend, was higher in 1998 than in 1970. 5 Two co-ordinators of UN humanitarian assistance to Iraq resigned their posts in protest at the human cost of sanctions. 6 A further form of disadvantage that has major implications when it comes to ensuring transparency and accountability is an educational one. 
Media controls
It follows from the above that disadvantage and accountability are in urgent need of public discussion in the Arab region. Yet laws and power structures restrain the Arab media from pursuing these issues. While 'censorship' is an appropriate description of the effect of these laws, it is important to recognise that censorship is achieved not only through direct supression of content, but also by more fundamental and less visible means, including regulation of media ownership, regulation of entry to the profession of journalism and regulation of printing and distribution, as well as extrajudicial intimidation of media practitioners and bars on access to information. Thus the authorities in a given country may say the country has a 'free press', because opposition parties are permitted to publish newspapers alongside the governmentowned dailies. Yet analysis of the full range of laws relating to freedom of expression reveals that the media are not free. Nor, on the whole, did they become freer over the 1990s despite changes in the media landscape over this period.
Layers of regulation
Egyptian law is fairly typical of Arab media law in several respects, including the monopoly it gives the state over radio and television broadcasting. Broadcasting is to be conducted by a national agency supervised by the minister of information -in other words, a member of the executive branch of government. By law, individuals are not allowed to own newspapers. Corporate entities seeking to publish must apply to a government-appointed body for a licence, putting up a bank deposit of £E1 million ($250,000) for a daily newspaper. Political party newspapers are allowed under the 1977 law on political parties, but the same law makes the licensing of parties subject to vetting by a committee whose membership is controlled by the president of the republic (himself the head of the ruling political party), whose members must include three government ministers and which is only considered quorate when those ministers are present. Printing and distribution of opposition newspapers is conducted by printing houses belonging to the main government-owned dailies; other printing takes place in a so-called free zone where entry and exit of goods is government-controlled. Journalists cannot choose which union to belong to.
By law, if they are not full members of the sole Journalists' Syndicate, whose operations and membership are legally subject to government oversight, they may not work as journalists or be hired by any publisher or news agency.
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These restrictions exist in addition to other curbs placed on media activity by the Penal Code, the Press Law and laws governing the content and screening of films, videos, books and stage plays. It is quite possible, for example that a drama shown on Egyptian television will have been through four censorship barriers. If it is published first as a book, it will be censored before publication. If it then becomes a stage play or film, approval for its adoption and subsequent performance will necessitate two further rounds of censorship. In order to be shown on television it will be checked yet again by the broadcasting censorship department. (Napoli, Amin and Boylan 1995: 171-72) .
One of the most significant changes on the Egyptian media scene over the past ten years has been the introduction of pre-trial detention for journalists under investigation for breaking censorship laws in the practice of their profession, together with a stiffening of the fines and prison sentences imposed for media 'crimes'. The draconian press law introduced in 1995 caused such an outcry that it was modified although only very slightly) before being re-issued the following year (Article XIX 1997a: 37-40) . Severe new press legislation was also introduced in other Arab states.
Jordan's 1993 press law was tightened by royal decree ahead of parliamentary elections in 1997, forcing the closure of 13 newspapers, most of them weekly (Sakr 2002: 115) . When Jordan's High Court of Justice ruled a few months after the election that the amendments were unconstitutional, the amendments were pushed through parliament as a law. Further changes in 1999 appeared to soften the press law somewhat, but were more than cancelled out by tight 'temporary' amendments to the Penal Code announced in October 2001.
Amendments to the Tunisian Press Code in 1993 reduced the validity of mandatory publishing permits. Permits that were previously issued for an unspecified period had thereafter to be submitted for renewal every year (Article XIX 1998: 39) . In January 1997, the Press Code requirement that copies of publications should be deposited with the ministries of interior, justice and information before distribution was extended to academic papers prepared for presentation at conferences in Tunisia, regardless of the venue (Ibid: 41). In Morocco, the 1999 accession of King Mohammed VI raised expectations that press regulation would be relaxed. In the event, the government 
Media ownership
With only one Arab state abolishing its principal censorship institution over the decade in question, the reasons behind the rise of the expatriate pan-Arab press and broadcasting are fairly clear. While media restrictions at home provided the 'push' for the emigré media, new openings created by deregulation in European capitals and the increasing accessibility of satellite technology provided the 'pull'. Abroad, however, the option of publishing or broadcasting was available only to those with sufficient means. For instance, Saudi Arabian media institutions, among the most tightly restricted in the home environment, took advantage of overseas operations to foster some debate of broad policy issues. Yet with members of the Saudi ruling family and their relatives or allies controlling these media outlets either directly or indirectly (Sakr 1999: 97-101) , the escape to a more liberal environment was not accompanied by any departure from the norms of deference to authority established inside the kingdom. Egyptian and Lebanese satellite channels, being produced by entities based in their countries of origin, were constrained by the imperatives of national legislation and politics discussed above. Against this background Al-Jazeera Satellite Channelstaffed by journalists from all over the Arab world, and operating in Qatar, the only Arab country to have officially abolished media censorship -established a reputation for innovation by hosting controversial policy debates. These in turn were seen by audiences as geared to promoting transparency and accountability on the part of power holders.
While Al-Jazeera's arrival prompted some other television stations to emulate its programmes in form, if only rarely in substance, 8 Cyprus and printed them in Egypt's free zone. As such they were vulnerable to regulatory changes affecting the free zone, including a sudden two-month ban on the printing of offshore publications, imposed by the General Authority for Foreign Investment in 1998. Unification in Yemen, followed by elections, was accompanied by expansion of the non-government press. This expansion was curtailed, and some papers suspended, from the mid-1990s onwards.
In the same way that money from the Saudi ruling family funded three major satellite television companies, it also financed the two leading pan-Arab newspapers, Asharq 
Curbs on NGOs
The heavy legal and practical constraints on freedom of expression outlined in the preceding sections make civil society a problematic category in the Arab world. When the state retains a tight grip over both traditional and modern institutions (from mosques to universities) as well as the means of production, a corollary of its strength is a weak civil society (Barakat 1993: 278) . It has also been argued that civil society did not exist as such in Arab states, even before the rise of the strong state, because the organisation of agricultural, artisanal and commercial activities, being based on clan membership, was incompatible with notions of citizenship inherent in the term 'civil society' (Khafaji 1994: 37) . Weakness vis-à-vis the authorities and an internal lack of civility are two persistent features that affect the ability of Arab civil society institutions to hold power-holders to account.
Lack of autonomy
The institutional weakness of voluntary associations, pressure groups and other nongovernmental organisations in Arab countries can be attributed to laws depriving them of autonomy. Such laws are consistent with a mode of interest representation that has all the monopolistic, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionallydifferentiated hallmarks of state corporatism, as identified by Schmitter (1974: 93-4) .
In circumstances where any activity, from publishing to running a youth club or charity, can be conducted legally only if it has been formally licensed by the state, activities that international norms classify as the prerogative of civil society depend instead on government approval and remain permanently subject to government intervention. Fund-raising and recruitment are particularly closely controlled. A whole range of bodies that are assumed in other contexts to be part of civil society -such as universities or trade unions -can hardly be described as such when their most influential personnel are appointed by, or on behalf of, the head of state. Ambiguities arising from this lack of autonomy contribute to a lack of interest in pluralism among would-be civil society groups. As the survival of voluntary, non-profit ventures is contingent and uncertain, survival becomes an objective in its own right, leading to a tendency for some groups to seek freedom of association and expression for themselves but not for others (Abdel-Rahman 1999; Najjar 1998: 37; Al-Bizri 1995: 151-4) . This is particularly, but not exclusively, true of associations that espouse codes of conduct derived from a particularly puritanical interpretation of Islam, which have little in common with liberal or universalist approaches to fundamental freedoms and human rights. The growth of such groups in the Gulf during the 1980s influenced expatriate Arabs working in Gulf countries, who took these ideologies back home when they were caught up in the population shifts that followed the 1991 Gulf war. forbade associations, charities and clubs from using their premises or resources for the benefit of any politically partisan organisation (Wiktorowicz 1999: 609-610) . In 1997, the Jordanian authorities issued reminders that they should be given two days' prior notice of public meetings. A 1998 ruling made foreign support for local research centres subject to government approval.
Given these developments, NGOs from Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere were so 
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the evolution of Arab media organisations and NGOs since the early 1990s to assess how far these bodies have contributed to pressure for transparency and accountability from power-holders in the Arab region. It was argued at the outset that the rationale for maximising transparency and accountability lay with their link to the potential for mobilising resources for development through taxation and investment. On the evidence presented here, the outlook is not promising.
A few positive trends were noted, as for example in limited moves towards separation of powers in some Gulf states, Morocco and (belatedly) the Palestinian Authority areas. There has also been the rise, led by Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel from Qatar, of transnational television news and current affairs broadcasting capable of evading censorship at the national level. This development has increased the information available to ordinary people about problems related to lack of transparency and accountability. Members of civil society groups, denied media access at home, can now dialogue via satellite television with people in other countries in the region and beyond. As a result, television viewers with satellite access now have a window onto civil society activities and concerns. The groups themselves remain subject to setbacks in the form of censorship and legal clampdowns, but these setbacks can no longer be wholly concealed from the outside world.
Steps required for the Arab media to move towards holding the powerful to account are implicit in the constraints under which media organisations in the region currently operate. This article identified multiple curbs on freedom of expression. Criminal defamation laws are a prime example, since by making defamation a criminal rather than a civil matter they make it punishable by imprisonment. Such laws, geared to giving special protection to public figures and civil servants, make the media in the Arab region accountable first and foremost to those in power. Since the right to criticise politicians and those who exercise political power is at the very heart of accountability, defamation laws need reform. Government monopoly ownership of terrestrial broadcasting in the majority of Arab countries also reflects a view of the media as a means of mobilising the masses behind certain policies and concepts of national unity. Such an approach is not compatible with investigative media that operate on criteria of newsworthiness. Indeed, the ending of government monopolies over terrestrial television and radio broadcasting has been recommended as a crucial step towards increasing media accountability. Creation of independent news agencies and private and/or community ownership of broadcasting media, including in rural areas, should be encouraged' (UNESCO 1996: 60-61 ).
This article also highlighted restrictions placed on the work of individual journalists.
Ownership of newspapers and broadcasting stations by the ruling establishment means that large numbers of journalists are effectively government employees.
Journalists' unions in most Arab countries are consequently only quasi-independent bodies. Their vaguely worded codes of ethics shield those in authority from criticism, whereas the purpose of ethical standards in free media is primarily to provide protection against misrepresentation.
Accountability in the Arab region would be served by reform not only of media legislation but also the laws that make NGOs subject to government authorization and supervision. As Arab civil society activists have protested, restrictions on their operations, from funding to relations with international bodies, deny them freedom of association and thereby contravene international human rights law. Pressure for transparency and accountability in the Arab region will be suppressed as long as the basic freedoms of expression and association are routinely denied. 
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